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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS, STATE OF UTAH 
MAURIA T. TANNER (SWENSEN), ) 
Plaintiff and Appellant, ] 
v. ] 
JAMES G. SWENSEN, JR., ] 
Defendant and Appellee. 
I BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
i Civil Case No. 924901803DA 
I Appellate Case No. 940079-CA 
RULE 9 (C)(2)A: JURISDICTIONAL AUTHORITY 
This appeal is authorized under Utah Code Annotated, sec* 78-
2-2 (3)(j), and Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 3 which indicates 
a procedure for taking appeals from judgments and order of trial 
courts. This brief follows the structural requirements outlined in 
Rule 24 of the Utah Rules of Appellant Procedure. This is an appeal 
by Mauria T. Tanner (Swensen), Plaintiff, from a judgment and 
Decree of Divorce. 
RULE 9(C)(3): NATURE OF PRECEDENCE 
This appeal is from a trial of the Third Judicial District 
Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, before the 
Honorable Dennis Frederick, without a jury. The final orders we.^ 
Amended Decree Of Divorce and Amended Findings Of Fact And 
Conclusions of Law. 
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STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES ON APPEAL 
1. Whether the division of the marital property was 
equitable. 
2. Whether the trial court abused its discretion in awarding 
alimony of $700 per month for a two-year period. 
3. Whether the trial court abused its discretion in imputing 
income from Tanner, Inc., as well as income from teaching Art 
classes in the past during the summer, for purposes of child 
support and alimony. 
4. Whether the trial court abused itfs discretion in using 
Ms. Tanner's interest in Tanner, Inc., in figuring child support 
and/or alimony. 
5. Whether the trial court abused its discretion in finding 
that Ms. Tanner has the future capacity to earn $20,000 a year in 
approximately two years. 
6. Whether the court abused its discretion in not awarding 
attorney's fees. 
7. Whether the trial court abused its discretion in not 
allowing Plaintifffs counsel to present a closing argument. 
RULE 9(C)4: STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The facts which are material to the questions presented on 
this appeal are as follows: 
Brief Of Appellant 
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1. The parties had a long-term marriage, approximately 19 
years. They were married on the 22nd day of November, 1974, in Salt 
Lake City, Utah. (Record at 23, line 15) 
2. The parties have four children. (Record at 21, line 13) 
3. Mauria Tanner worked to help James Swensen, Jr. obtain 
two separate graduate degrees. (Record at 23, lines 18-25, Record 
at 24, line 1-6) 
4. James Swensen, Jr., is currently a tax attorney as well 
as a Certified Public Accountant with a Masters Degree in 
Accountancy. (Record at 23 & 24) 
5. Ms. Tanner has recently begun a graduate program which 
should be completed within two years with a Masters Degree in 
Expressive Therapy from the University of Utah. (Record 23, lines 
1-10) 
6. Ms. Tanner testified that in two years, she is hopeful 
that she might earn up to $20,000 a year. (Record at 94, lines 2-4) 
7. Mr. Swensen's projected annual income for the year of 
1993 was $67,500 (Defendant's Exhibit 2, page 0000043) 
8. Ms. Tanner has, in the past, earned approximately $1,500 
a year for teaching Art in the summer time; however, she is not 
planning to continue this seasonal job as a result of her year 
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round school obligation, (Transcript of Judge's Ruling, page 3, 
line 19) 
9. Ms. Tanner owes her Father $3,000, of which $2,000 went 
to Attorney's fees. (Record 35, lines 13-18) 
10. Ms. Tanner paid just under $5,000 for Attorney's fees 
just prior to the loan from her Father. (Record at 35, lines 16-18) 
11. Ms. Tanner owed approximately $12,000 to law offices of 
present counsel. (Record 36, lines 17-20) 
12. Ms. Tanner's lifestyle significantly altered since the 
separation. (Record at 39, lines 5-20) 
13. The Tanner Corporation made disbursements for the purpose 
of paying the personal taxes of the parties. (Record at 48, lines 
3-3) 
14. Ms. Tanner had no control over any of the IRA's , 
retirement accounts, savings accounts, or other significant marital 
assets during separation - making no withdrawals from any of these 
accounts. (Record at 51, lines 23-25, Record at 52, lines 5-6) 
15. Ms. Tanner never gave her permission to use or withdraw 
marital funds. (Record at 55, lines 1-2) 
16. Mr. Swensen withdrew significant amounts from the marital 
IRA accounts during the separation. (Record at 53, lines 14-19) 
17. Defendant/Appellee, James Swensen gave himself zero value 
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for furniture, he has in his possession, although he admits taking 
marital property. (Record at 152, lines 1-25, record at 153, lines 
1-4, record 155, lines 1-25, and record at 156, lines 1-25) 
18. Defendant/Appellee, James Swensen paid his personal legal 
fees from marital funds during the separation. (Record at 164, 
lines 11-15) 
19. Defendant/Appellee, James Swensen used marital funds to 
pay off his student loans in the approximate amount of $10,996. 
(Record at 168, lines 2-25) 
20. Plaintifffs expert witness, a CPA, never received 
requested materials and relied upon Swensenfs figure for 
values regarding Defendant's business. (Record at 7, lines 7-20, 
record at 16, lines 10-18, and record at 19, lines 20-25) 
21. Ms. Tanner has received some monies on a periodic basis 
from Tanner, Inc., a family corporation. These disbursements have 
occurred approximately five times in 19 years. The amounts have 
varied. Ms. Tanner has generally received approximately $2,000 in 
one year until several years ago when she received $8,000 two 
years in succession. (Record at 50, lines 24-25, record at 51) 
22. Ms. Tanner received these two $8,000 amounts as a result 
of the sale of a trading post business. (Record at 48, lines 18-23, 
record at 50, lines 12-23) 
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23. The two previous disbursements from Tanner Inc. were 
$2,000 and $4,000 respectively. (Record at 49, lines 1-5) 
24. These disbursements were generally intended to cover Ms. 
Tannerfs allotted portion of the taxes for the family business. 
(Record at 50) 
25. Ms. Tanner has been advised that she will not be 
receiving any more lump sum payments as large as the amount of 
$8,000 in the future by her father, Mr. Maurice Tanner, the 
President of Tanner, Inc. Those larger $8,000 amounts accrued 
solely as a result of the sale of the trading post business. 
(Record at 50, lines 12-33) 
26. At trial, Plaintifffs counsel was not given the 
opportunity to present a closing argument to make the court aware 
of case law which pertained to the issues of fact and law before 
the court, (Record at 192, lines 20-24) 
27. The trial court imputed income from sources no longer 
available to Ms. Tanner.(Record at 50, lines 12-33) 
28. Ms. Tanner is planning to pursue a Ph.D. degree if 
possible. Such training will require approximately 7 years (2 years 
for the Masters1 degree and an additional 5 years for the Ph.D.) 
(Record at 99, lines 20-25, record at 100, line 1) 
29. Ms. Tanner was awarded alimony for 2 years (Transcript of 
Brief Of Appellant 
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Judgefs Ruling, pages 1 & 2) 
STANDARD OF REVIEW ON APPEAL 
The Standard of Review on Appeal is that the Appellate Court 
must reverse if there is a misapplication or misunderstanding of 
the law, if the evidence clearly preponderates against the findings 
or conclusions or if there is a serious inequity that must be 
rectified as set forth in English v. English, 565 Pc2d 409, 410 
(Utah 1977). 
ISSUES FOR REVIEW 
1. The division of the marital property was not equitable. 
Newmeyer v. Newmever, 745 P.2d 1276, 1279 (Utah 1987), stated that 
"in determining whether a certain division of property is equitable 
... the relative abilities of the spouses to support themselves 
after the divorce are pertinent to an equitable...division of the 
fixed assets of the marriage". 
Ms. Tanner contends that in the division of the property, the 
trial court did not take into consideration her special 
circumstances, i.e., her relative lack of work experience, and her 
full-time student status. 
2. The court accepted values of property not consistent with 
the worth of the property if sold, causing an inequitable division 
of property. 
Brief Of Appellant 
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3. The court's award of $700 per month alimony for a two-
year period is an abuse of discretion. Johnson v. Johnson, 855 P.2d 
250, 214 Utah Adv. Rep. 41 (1994). 
4. The court abused its discretion in imputing income from 
Tanner, Inc., as well as income from teaching Art classes in the 
summer as Ms. Tanner can no longer participate in that activity 
because of her participation in year-round schooling. Savage v. 
Savage. 658 P.2d 1201, (S. Ct. 1983). Weston v. Weston, 773 P.2d 
408, 107 Utah Adv. Rep. 78. Ms. Tanner provided an accurate figure 
regarding income for the purposes of child support. 
5. Ms. Tanner's interest in Tanner, Inc. qualifies as a pre-
inheritance gift and the court abused it's discretion in utilizing 
the family corporation in figuring child support and/or alimony, 
as it was not income but a property interest. 
A. Ms. Tanner testified at trial that her brothers and 
sisters also received similar disbursements to hers. 
B. That the Tanner family corporation has been in place for 
approximately 35 years and it was in the form of pre-
inheritance. (Record at 46, lines 16-21, record at 47, 
line 11, and record at 47, lines 24-25). Typically, 
inherited property will be awarded to the person who 
inherited it, even when the property was inherited years 
before the divorce. 
C. Newmeyer v, Newmeyer, 745 P.2d 1276 (Ut. 1987). If the 
court should determine that Tanner, Inc., was not pre-
inheritance, it would be forced to admit that the 
Plaintiff's/Appellant's interest in the family 
corporation property was premarital property, at the very 
Brief Of Appellant 
Appellate Case. No. 940079-CA 
Page 8 
least, an interest which had not been commingled into the 
marital estate, and one that was not augmented and/or 
maintained by the other spouse in any capacity. A court 
must find unique circumstances that warrant disregarding 
the general rule that premarital property is separate 
property. Waiters v. Waiters. 812 P.2d 64 (Ut. App. 
1989). 
6. The trial court abused its discretion in finding that Msc 
Tanner could earn $20,000 a year in two years, after she completed 
her schooling. It presumed that she will indeed complete the 
schooling, secure employment and earn that amount. Wiley v. Wiley. 
227 Ut. Adv. Rep. 39 (1993), found such a finding improper. 
7. The court abused its discretion in not awarding 
attorneyfs fees. Utah law provides that the award be based upon the 
need of the party seeking the award, and reasonableness of the fee 
sought. Hue* v. Hue*, 734 P.2d 417 (Ut. 1986). Sinclair v. 
Sinclair, 718 P.2d 396 (Ut. 1986). Pusev v. Pusev, 728 P.2d 117 
(Ut. 1986). Rasband v. Rasband, 752 P.2d 1331, 1337 (Ut. App. 
1988). 
8. The court abused its discretion in not allowing 
Plaintiff's counsel to present argument and cases relevant to the 
matter at bar in closing argument. Bunnell v. The Industrial 
Commission of Utah, 740 P.2d 1331, 62 Utah Adv. Repc 9 (1987). 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is a divorce action involving the issues of alimony, 
property division, award of attorney fees and the related issues of 
pre-inheritance property assessed as income as well as the 
appropriateness of imputing income to Plaintiff/Appellant. 
These matters were heard at trial before the Honorable J. 
Dennis Frederick in the Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah, on the 16th day of December, 1993. 
The final order and Judgement in this matter was executed on 
the 22nd day of February, 1994. 
Notice of Appeal was filed on the 4th day of February, 1994, 
pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, Section 78-2-2 (3) (j) and Utah 
Rule of Appellate Procedure 3. 
Ms. Tanner received alimony for a two year period in the 
amount of $700.00, even though she had a long-term marriage of 20 
years, had been married to a tax attorney and CPA, for whom she had 
worked in order that he receive his professional degrees and 
credentials. 
The trial courts' holdings in regards to property division, 
alimony, attorneys fees, imputation of income from a family 
corporation, etc., caused the Plaintiff/Appellant to bring this 
appeal. 
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The assets of the marriage were not divided equitably. The 
Appellee during the term of marriage controlled all marital assetsc 
Appellant had no aecess to marital funds during the pendancy, while 
Appellee used marital funds for his personal benefit such as his 
own attorney fees. 
Newmeyer v. Newmeyer, 745 P.2d 1276, (Utah 1987) states that 
division of property must also take into consideration the earning 
capabilities of the parties, the ability of the parties to support 
themselves after the divorce as well as the amount of alimony 
awarded. The court did not properly consider the appellant's 
ability to earn a living regarding the property division, 
especially in light of the fact that the court awarded only $700„ 00 
a month alimony for a two year period, even though the 
Defendant/Appellee was a professional (tax attorney) and the 
marriage was of a long duration. 
In addition, the alimony award was inequitable. The court did 
not take into consideration the factors in Jones v. Jones, 700 Po/ 
1072 (Utah S.C. 1985). 
The court improperly imputed income from pre-inheritance 
disbursements from Appellant's family in determining alimony ev@^ 
though the evidence indicated Appellant would not receive futi 
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disbursements of said funds. The court also imputed income from 
Appellant's past participation in summer art classes, even though 
Appellant testified that as a result of her student status, she 
would no longer have an opportunity to teach those classes. 
The trial court refused to award Plaintiff/Appellant her 
attorney fees even though the evidence indicated Defendant/Appellee 
used marital funds to pay his own attorney fees, and the evidence 
also indicated that Appellant was a full-time student without any 
income. In addition, Appellant testified she had borrowed monies to 
pay for fees and costs of the divorce action. The courtfs findings 
over-all demonstrated a general attitude of bias against 
Plaintiff/Appellant which prejudiced the Appellant's right to a 
fair and impartial trial. 
POINT l: 
DETAIL OF THE ARGUMENT 
The division of the marital property was not equitable. 
Newmever v. Newmeyer, 745 P.2d 1276, 1279(Utah 1987), states thats 
(in) determining whether a certain division of property 
is equitable, neither the trial court nor this Court 
considers the property division in a vacuum. The amount 
of alimony awarded and the relative earning capabilities 
of the parties are also relevant, because the relative 
abilities of the spouses to support themselves after the 
divorce are pertinent to an equitable determination of 
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the division of the fixed assets of the marriage. 
The trial court did not take the special circumstances of Ms. 
Tanner into consideration when making the property division. During 
the course of the marriage, the couple had four children, and Ms. 
Tanner worked in minor clerical jobs. After the family began to 
grow, Ms. Tanner worked only intermittently, usually teaching Art 
classes in the summer to neighborhood children. Her primary 
occupation, during the marriage, was raising children, caring for 
the needs of her husband, and running the couple's home. Ms. Tanner 
has no professional training and few marketable skills. Ms. Turner 
has no dependable outside income. As a result of the success of the 
law practice of Mr. Swensen, the couple enjoyed a very comfortable 
lifestyle. Ms. Tanner was awarded no income producing assets. 
(Transcript of Judge's Ruling, page 3, lines 2-5) 
Ms. Tanner was at a tremendous disadvantage regarding the 
marital property. She had no control over marital funds, during 
the marriage and/or the separation, nor investments, bank accounts 
and/or Real Property. Mr. Swensen controlled all of the assets -
making deposits, withdrawals, investments at will, without 
permission from Ms. Tanner, and often without even informing her of 
any of these transactions. (Record at 51, lines 23-25; 52, lines 5-= 
6; 55, lines 1-2; 53, lines 14-19; 48, lines 3-4; 164, 11-15; 168, 
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lines 2-25; 52, lines 1-25; and at 58, lines 23-20. 
Ms. Tanner received some monies from Tanner, Inc., during the 
years of the marriage, but this money was intended to cover Ms. 
Tannerfs allotted portion of taxes for the family business and was 
not intended to supplement her income. She has been informed by her 
father, Mr. Maurice Tanner, that she will not be receiving any more 
large disbursements of money from Tanner, Inc., similar to those 
she had in the recent past because those monies had come from the 
sale of a family business. Ms. Tanner has no current income that 
she can depend upon for support. 
Mr. Swensen on the other hand, has a law degree and a degree 
in accounting. He is a successful tax attorney and a Certified 
Public Accountant. Mr. Swensen1s projected annual income for the 
year of 1993 was $67,000. (Defendants exhibit 2, page 0000043) 
The division of property as done by the trial court creates an 
inequity by dividing the property in such a way that Ms. Tanner 
does not have any income from the properties she received to 
support herself, yet Mr. Swensen has the benefit of the property he 
received and the degrees he holds to support himself. 
In addition, the court accepted the values proffered on the 
exhibits as valid even though Defendant claimed a zero value. 
(Defendant's exhibit 1, page 000001) The testimony controverted 
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that assertion as Defendant had removed tools and furniture from 
the marital home. In addition, the court did not take into 
consideration the fact that Mr. Swensen used marital funds under 
his care, custody and control to pay his attorney fees and other 
personal expenses attributable to him, such as a $10,996.00 studenl 
loan. 
Ms. Tanner had no marital assets available to her during the 
pendency and was left with a substantial amount of costs and fees 
which the court ordered her to pay, some of which Ms. Tanner 
borrowed money to cover. 
Ms. Tanner worked to support Mr. Swensen while he earned his 
degrees and yet an inequitable division of the property was 
performed leaving her without sufficient income to support herself 
in a manner approaching the standard of living reached during the 
marriage. There is not sufficient finding of fact to show that Mse 
Tanner can support herself. There is sufficient findings to show 
that Mr. Swensen can support himself on his current income. The 
property division was not conducted in a manner that reflected the 
parties abilities to earn income and has created an inequitable 
situation that leaves Ms. Tanner without a means of supporting 
herself, and in debt. 
POINT 2: 
Brief Of Appellant 
Appellate Case. No, 940079-CA 
Page 15 
ALIMONY ISSUE 
The parties were married for twenty years. During the course 
of the marriage, the parties bought a home, had four children, and 
Mr. Swensen established a law practice specializing in tax law. 
During the early years of the marriage, Ms. Tanner worked in minor 
clerical jobs. After the family began to grow, Ms. Tanner worked 
only intermittently, usually teaching art classes in the summer to 
neighborhood children. Her primary occupation, during the 
marriage, was raising children, caring for the needs of her husband 
and running the couple's home. 
In a divorce proceeding, the trial court may make such 
orders concerning property distribution and alimony as 
are equable. U.C.A., 1953, § 30-3-5 (1984 ed.). See, 
e.g., Hiahlev v. Hiahlev, Utah, 676 P.2d 379, 382 (1983); 
Doritv v. Poritv, Utah, 645 P.2d 56, 59 (1982); English 
v. English, Utah, 565 P.2d 409, 410 (1977). The trial 
court must exercise its discretion in accordance with the 
standards that have been set by this Court. In the 
present case, we find that the trial court did not comply 
with those standards. Jones v. Jonesf 700 P.2d 1072 (Ut. 
S.C. 1985) Id Page 2. The court only awarded alimony for 
a two year period, even though the evidence demonstrated 
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a substantial disparity in income between the parties, as 
well as the ability to produce income in the future; that 
Plaintiff contributed to the degrees of Defendant, by 
working while he was in graduate school and the marriage 
was of long duration - twenty years. 
In Jones, the court describes the purpose of alimony: 
[T]he most important function of alimony is to 
provide support for the wife as nearly as possible at the 
standard of living she enjoyed during marriage, and to 
prevent the wife from becoming a public charge, English 
v. English, 565 P.2d at 411. With this purpose in mind, 
the Court in English articulated three factors that must 
be considered in fixing a reasonable alimony award: 
[1] the financial conditions and needs of the wife; 
[2] the ability of the wife to produce a sufficient 
income for herself; and 
[3] the ability of the husband to provide support." 
Id at Page 4. 
In the case at hand, nowhere in the trial court's 
decision, its findings of fact, or its statements made on cfa 
record at the conclusion of the hearing is there any indication 
that the court adequately analyzed the circumstances of the p,^ " 
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in light of these three factors. And our attempt to perform this 
analysis through a review of the record and evidence compels us to 
conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in fixing the 
alimony award. In addition, the record exemplifies the courts 
attitude about the Plaintiff, when the court commented after 
Plaintifffs/Appellants counsel requested that the court make 
Plaintiff a beneficiary, along with the children, on the life 
insurance policy of Defendant/Appellee, at least during the period 
she had a right to alimony. The court commented: "... I'm concerned 
about the protection of the children, not the protection of the 
Plaintiff here". Transcripts of (Judge's Ruling, page 7, lines 12-
14) 
The tone and tenor of the entire proceeding evidenced the 
court's lack of concern for Plaintiff's/Appellant's rights. 
As in Jones, other than the assets awarded her in the property 
distribution, Ms. Tanner has no dependable outside income. As a 
result of the success of the law practice of Mr. Swensen, the 
couple, as did the parties in Jones, enjoyed a very comfortable 
lifestyle. In the instant case, as in Jones, the wife was awarded 
no income-producing assets. 
It is almost certain that Ms. Tanner will be unable to 
maintain anything even approaching the standard of living she 
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enjoyed during the marriage, given the $700 per month alimony 
awarded by the trial court for two years and the termination of 
that award at that time. 
The second factor to be considered in Jones is the wifefs 
ability to produce a sufficient income for herself. Ms. Tanner 
was married in her early twenties. Shefs been married for twenty 
years. The paid work she did in the early years of the marriage and 
the miscellaneous functions she performed during the summer were 
all relatively unskilled in nature. During most of the marriage, 
with the full consent and support of her husband, she devoted her 
time to raising their four children. She has no professional 
training and few marketable skills. The husband managed the 
finances of both the family and the business and provided his wife 
with an allowance to cover her expenses. The wife has no 
independent income. Intermittently, she received from her parents, 
from a family corporation which provided some money for taxes. It 
is entirely unrealistic to assume that a woman in her 40fs, with n© 
substantial work experience or training, will be able to enter the 
job market and support herself in anything even resembling the 
style in which the couple had been living. 
The family corporation, Tanner Inc., provided past money that 
Ms. Tanner cannot depend upon in the future. As a matter of fact, 
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her father has advised Ms. Tanner that she will, in all likelihood, 
not receive any future distributions. 
The final factor to be considered, as outlined in Jones, is 
the ability of the husband to provide support to the wife. The 
record shows that although the husband paid himself an annual 
income of approximately $67,472 from the proceeds of his law 
practice, the total profits from the business actually amounted to 
almost $130,000 per year. While the trial court apparently viewed 
the $67,472 as the husband's total annual income for purposes of 
determining alimony, in fact he had control over all the profits, 
but chose to take only a portion of them as personal income and to 
set the rest aside for reinvestment in the business. 
Mr. Swensen is an expert in finance and tax as he not only has 
a law degree but he is also a certified public account, as well as 
having a masters in accounting. During the marriage the Defendant 
controlled all the finances, investments, etc., of the couple. As 
a matter of fact, Ms. Tanner was unsure, as the divorce proceedings 
were initiated in this case, what investments and assets the couple 
actually owned. 
Ms. Tanner was definitely at a disadvantage regarding the 
assets in the marriage. Even the last figures provided by Mr« 
Swensen regarding investments were modified just before trial in 
Brief Of Appellant 
Appellate Case. No. 940079-CA 
Page 20 
his exhibits making the figures he provided earlier for Ms. Tanner^ 
which she used on her exhibits, outdated. The new figures were 
never made available prior to trial even though Mr. Swensen 
admitted in his testimony that the parties were going by the last 
set of figures provided and there was a cut-off date the parties 
had informally agreed upon. Never the less, Mr. Swensenfs figures 
had been updated for trial on his exhibits. 
The exhibits containing updated figures which were not 
available to Ms. Tanner constructively nullified her exhibits^ 
making them inconvenient and literally unusable by the trial courtt 
On the record, there is no reason to surmise that the income 
generated by the defendant's law practice will decrease in the 
future. The Defendant, therefore, as sole owner, is in LA'H 
excellent position to provide adequate continuing support to his 
ex-spouse. And yet, the trial court ordered alimony for only 
period of two years, at a mere $700.00 a month. 
Jones, analyzes the apportionment of income in a clos" 
corporation between personal and business uses. It states: 
The apportionment of income between personal and 
business uses is quite properly a matter left to the 
discretion of the husband as owner of the pharmacy and 
gift shop. However, how he chooses to allocate that 
profit is not binding on the court in determining his 
ability to pay alimony to his ex-spouse. The full profit 
produced by the business, adjusted by the court to take 
into account legitimate and reasonable needs of the 
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business for additional capital, should have been used as 
the basis for assessing the husbandfs ability to provide 
for his spouse. In making this analysis, the trial court 
should not permit all claims of need for capital on the 
part of the business to take precedence over the support 
needs of the wife. If these capital needs are a result 
of discretionary decisions of the husband to expand and 
improve the business, rather than to maintain it in its 
present condition, then to permit him to divert income 
into the business at the expense of his ex-spouse fs 
support needs would be to permit him to enrich himself at 
her expense. 
The analysis and the facts of Jones relate to the present 
case. 
Both were marriages of long duration. Both situations 
involved a closed corporation owned and controlled by the husband. 
Both wives remained at home involved in domestic duties. Both 
wives had no history of any significant personal income. 
As in Jones and the foregoing analysis leads us to the 
conclusion in the present case that the trial court's alimony award 
was inequitable, both in terms of the initial amount and its 
termination. Ms. Tanner is in her 40fs, possesses few marketable 
job skills, and has little hope of ever recovering her former 
standard of living. This is simply not the sort of situation in 
which a small alimony is appropriate. The husband operates a 
financially successful business, built up over twenty years of 
marriage through the joint efforts of both the husband and the 
wife. These facts clearly call for some form of continuing spousal 
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maintenance. The original award must be more substantial 
considering the husband's real discretionary income, and should 
continue at that level for the foreseeable future. 
We believe it is consistent with the goal of equalizing the 
parties1 post divorce status to look to the standard of living 
existing at or near the time of trial in determining alimony. This 
is consonant with the treatment of both marital property and child 
support and is better designed to equip both parties to go forward 
with their separate lives with relatively equal odds. It is 
further justified because any future changes in alimony are limited 
to instances where a material change of circumstances has occurred. 
Bridenbaucrh v. Bridenbauqh, 786 P.2d 241, 242 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) . 
Determining the standard of living is a fact-sensitive and 
subjective task. The standard of living cannot be determined by 
actual expenses alone. Those expenses may be necessarily lower 
than needed to maintain an appropriate standard of living for any 
number of reasons. As Webster says, standard of living includes 
"customary or proper status" considering the parties8 
circumstances. Those circumstances should be evaluated at the time 
of trial. In light of the facts of this case, we conclude that the 
trial court erred in not looking at not only the pre-separation 
standard of living in setting alimony, but also considering thf 
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standard of living "during the marriage" up to the time of trial. 
In this case, it was inequitable and an abuse of discretion to 
ignore standard of living, along with all relevant facts 
surrounding it. 
The alimony award, in the instant case, does not come close to 
equalizing the parties1 standard of living, as Ms. Tanner continues 
to be a student with little or no income and Mr. Swensen continues 
to build his law practice with substantial income. 
As in Howel v. Hovel, 806 P.2d 1209, 155 Utah Adv. Rep., there 
was an improper analysis of this point allowing the husband a two 
to four times advantage. 
Utah's appellate courts have considered the appropriateness of 
alimony after a long-term marriage, where the wife (usually) has 
worked primarily in the home, has limited job skills, and is in her 
late forties or fifties. Gardner, 748 P.2d 1076; Rasband, 752 P.2d 
1331, 1333. In Jones v. Jones, 700 P.2d 1072 (Utah 1985), the 
supreme court found alimony awarded inadequate to allow the wife a 
standard of living even approaching that experienced during the 
marriage, and described the marriage as follows: 
During most of the marriage, with the full consent and support 
of her husband, [the wife] devoted her time to raising their four 
children and donating her services to various social service 
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organizations... It is entirely unrealistic to assume that a woman 
in her middle years, with no substantial work experience or 
training, will be able to enter the job market and support herself 
in anything even resembling the style in which the couple had been 
living. 
In the present case, the plaintiff spent the majority of her 
time raising children and caring for the home. 
At this point in time, there is no way plaintiff can even 
recoup and catch up to the earning potential of her former husband* 
In Sampinos v. Sampinos, 750 P.2d 615, 77 Utah Adv. Rep. 24, 
the court reviewed this issue pertaining to alimony: 
Did the trial court award plaintiff alimony based solely 
on defendant's ability to pay rather than on the parties' needs and 
income earnings abilities? 
The court explains in Sampinos that: 
in an action for divorce, the trial court has considerable 
discretion to provide for spousal support. Bushell v. Bushell, 649 
P. 2d 85, 88 (Utah 1982). However, the trial court must make 
findings on all material issues, and such findings must be 
sufficiently detailed and consist of enough subsidiary facts to 
reveal the steps the court took to reach its conclusions on each 
factual issue presented. Failure to substantiate such findings 
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constitutes reversible error unless the facts in the record are 
"clear, uncontroverted, and capable of supporting only a finding in 
favor of the judgment." Lee v. Lee, 744 P.2d 1378, 1380 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1987) (quoting Action v. Deliran, 737 P.2d 996, 999 (Utah 
1987)). The courtfs findings in the instant case, do not include 
any facts revealing the steps taken to reach conclusions of how the 
court determined the alimony award and without sufficient detail. 
(Transcript of Judgefs Ruling) 
The Sampino court explain the basis of its alimony award when: 
Alimony - Defendant contends that the trial court abused 
its discretion in awarding plaintiff alimony based solely on his 
ability to pay rather than on the parties1 needs and income-
producing abilities. The Utah Supreme Court has enunciated that 
the purpose of spousal support is to "enable the receiving spouse 
to maintain, as nearly as possible, the standard of living enjoyed 
during the marriage and to prevent the spouse from becoming a 
public charge." Paffel v. Paffel, 732 P.2d 96, 100 (Utah 1986). 
Three factors must be considered in fixing alimony awards: (1) the 
financial condition and needs of the spouse claiming support; (2) 
the ability of the spouse to produce sufficient income for himself 
or herself; and (3) the ability of the responding spouse to provide 
the support. Id. at 101. 
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The court in the present case seemed to focus solely on the 
defendant's ability to pay,neglecting the issue of potential loss 
of standard of living and future income in the Plaintiff. 
Ms. Tanner is a full time student who hopes to be able to earn 
$20,000 per year once she has earned her masters degree. There is 
no guarantee that she will be able to realize that hope. In 
addition, Ms. Tanner would hope to continue on in her education to 
earn a Ph.D., which would push back the time when she would be 
qualified to begin work and earn an additional four years. Mrc 
Swensen has the potential as an expert in tax law to earn more than 
three times what Ms. Tanner only hopes to earn in the future. Mr« 
Swensen has a successful law practice and there is no evidence that 
his ability to maintain or increase his yearly income will not 
change in the future. 
Ms. Tanner has no guarantee what her future income will be, or 
when she will begin to earn it. The trial court's alimony award 
will terminate in two years regardless of her status, employed or 
not. Ms. Tanner could easily still be a student without any ability 
to produce income after such a short period. This is blatantly 
unfair. 
The trial court erred in making its alimony award of $700 pe^ 
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month for a two year period. There was not a sufficient showing of 
fact establishing that Ms. Tanner will continue to receive large 
disbursements from the Tanner family business nor that she will 
earn $20,000 per year in two years. Nor that she will have income 
in two years. The facts in the record are not "clear, 
uncontroverted, and capable of supporting only a finding in favor 
of the judgment". Gardner v. Gardner. 748 P.2d 1076, 73 Utah Adv. 
Rep. 35 (1988) (quoting Action v. Deleran, 737 P.2d 996, 999 (Utah 
1987). 
The trial court abused its discretion and created an 
inequitable situation where Ms. Tanner has no idea what her 
economic situation will be two years from now. Ms. Tanner may not 
be able to find a job making $20,000 per year or she may find that 
she is incapable of completing her masters degree. Ms. Tanner may 
have no choice in two years but to become a public charge which is 
certainly one of the circumstances the award of alimony is designed 
to prevent. 
The failure of the trial court to make sufficient findings on 
this material issue, as well as the short term minimal award is 
reversible error. 
POINT 3: 
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IMPUTED PAST INCOME 
The trial court abused its discretion in imputing income from 
Tanner, Inc., as well as income from teaching Art classes in the 
summer. Ms. Tanner can no longer participate in the summer art 
classes because of her enrollment in year-round graduate school. 
The trial court imputed this income for purposes of child support 
and alimony. Wherefore the child support and alimony awards should 
be figured without using the imputed income amount. Savage v. 
Savage, 658 P.2d 1201, (Ut. S. Ct. 1983). Weston v. Weston, 773 
P.2d 408, 107 Utah Adv. Rep 78. The court was aware that Ms. Tanner 
was no longer able to produce extra summer income and yet they 
imputed income to her in any case. 
In addition, Ms. Tanner had received disbursements of money 
from Tanner Inc., in the past but the money historically had been 
used to pay income taxes allotted to Ms. Tanner from the business. 
There had in the past been some small amounts of money left over 
after the taxes were paid but was never a sum large enough to 
contribute to the families living expenses. The last two 
disbursements were larger than the rest however, ($8,000 a piece) 
and were attributable to the sale of the family business. Mr. 
Maurice Tanner, the president of Tanner, Inc., and Ms. Tanner's 
father, informed Ms. Tanner that she would not be receiving any 
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future disbursements as large as the ones in the past. She cannot, 
therefore, depend on disbursements of money from Tanner, Inc., to 
support herself in the future. 
As mentioned above, Ms. Tanner had also earned a small income 
from teaching Art classes to neighborhood children during the 
summer months but this income has also stopped. She was capable of 
teaching during the summers because she was not attending school 
herself and she could rely upon Mr. Swensenfs income to support the 
family as the income from teaching was not significant 
(approximately $1,500). Ms. Tanner is currently a full-time year-
round student. She will not be able to teach the art classes and 
continue her education during the summers. If she did teach the 
classes it would cause a delay in her obtaining her masters degree 
in all probability, as much as a year. Ms. Tanner cannot afford the 
delay that teaching the art classes would cause. Ms. Tanner has no 
future plans to earn income from teaching art during the summer 
months• 
The trial court, however, imputed the income that Ms. Tanner 
made in the past from the two above mentioned sources when 
determining the amount of child support and alimony awards. The 
court in Wiley v. Wiley, 227 Utah Adv. Rep. 39 (Utah Ct. App. 
1993), faced a similar problem. The trial court found that Mrs. 
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Wiley was capable of earning an income of between $1,500 and $2,000 
per month, based on her education and qualifications. The trial 
court had not made its award based upon the Jones factors, which 
include Mrs. Wileyfs financial need, Mr. Wiley1s financial need, 
and the ability of Mr. Wiley to provide support. Id. 
In the instant case, the trial court did not look at Ms. 
Tanner's actual ability to support herself and what her financial 
needs were. She was no longer capable of teaching art classes 
during the summer and she would no longer be receiving large 
disbursements of money from Tanner Inc. The potential for income 
from these two sources were no longer present yet the trial court 
used these factors in its computations. Using these factors instead 
of the Jones factors is reversible error by the trial court. 
POINT 4: 
PRE-INHERITANCE/PREMARITAL PROPERTY 
Ms. Tanner's interest in Tanner Inc. qualifies as a pre-
inheritance gift and the court should not have utilized the family 
corporation in any capacity in figuring child support or alimony, 
as it was not income but a property interest. Typically, inherited 
property will be awarded to the person who inherited it, even when 
the property was inherited during the marriage• In Preston ye 
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Preston. 646 P.2d 705, 706 (Utah 1982), the court stated that 
inheritance acquired during the marriage was property excluded from 
the valuation of the marital assets. 
In the instant case the property interest was inherited before 
the marriage. The Tanner family corporation was formed 35 years ago 
and predates the marriage. The disbursements of money sent to Ms. 
Tanner over the course of the 19 year marriage were sent mainly to 
cover Ms. Tanner's personal taxes with only several hundred dollars 
left over to go to personal use. The large disbursements of $8,000 
were the result of one of the family businesses being sold and Ms. 
Tanner has been informed that no future disbursements of $8,000 
will be forthcoming. 
At no point, however, were the disbursements made that could 
be used to support the couple. The assets derived from Tanner Inc. 
were never commingled with the Swensen family funds except in the 
paying of personal taxes. None of the Swensen family property was 
purchased with funds acquired from Tanner Inc. 
Mr. Swensen has not augmented or maintained Tanner Inc., in 
any way. 
The assets brought into the marriage by one party that were 
not commingled with the family assets should be excluded from the 
valuation of the marital assets. The court in Jesperson v. 
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Jesperson. 610 P.2d 326, 328 (Utah 1980), said it was not 
unreasonable for the trial court to withdraw from marital property 
the equivalent of assets brought into the marriage. 
Tanner Inc. was structured as a Family Corporation whose 
holdings primarily included land. Ms. Tanner was not a salaried 
employee of Tanner Inc. She did not receive regular disbursements 
of money. Her siblings also received equal disbursements to those 
she received. The corporation was structured with the purpose of 
transferring inheritable property to the Tanner children, prior to 
the death of the Tanner parents. 
The court erred in determining that funds secured from Tanner 
Inc. was income to Ms. Tanner, in determining an equitable support 
award. At the very least, if the court dismisses the premise that 
the Tanner Inc. proceeds were pre-inheritance properties, it must 
certainly consider those proceeds pre-marital. 
The general rule regarding premarital property as expressed in 
Walters v. Walters, 812 P.2d 64 (Ut. App 1989), is that "(b)fore a 
trial court can include either of the parties1 premarital property 
in the marital estate, it must find unique circumstances that 
warrant disregarding the general rule that premarital property is 
separate property", (emphasis added). There must be a sufficiently 
detailed finding to show how the trial court determined that the 
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premarital property should be included in the marital estate. Id. 
In the instant case, there was no detailed finding explaining 
how the trial court warranted including the disbursements received 
in the past in any capacity in figuring child support or alimony. 
The court committed error in doing so, as the family corporation 
monies were not income but a property interest that was pre-
inheritance or at the very least premarital in nature. 
POINT 5: 
IMPUTED FUTURE INCOME 
The trial court abused its discretion in finding that Ms. 
Tanner could earn $20,000 a year in two years, after she completed 
her education. The trial court awarded Ms. Tanner $700 per month 
alimony that will terminate in two years presumably on the premise 
that she would finish her masters degree in recreational therapy 
and obtain employment at $20,000 per year. 
Obtaining a masters degree is a demanding pursuit that is 
attempted by many and finished by few. There is no guarantee that 
Ms. Tanner will be able to finish the work for the masters degree 
or that her work will be sufficient to actually earn the degree. In 
addition, Ms. Tanner stated that she hoped to obtain employment 
after receiving her masters degree making $20,00 per year. She did 
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not indicate that she had already secured employment at that rate 
of pay. There is again no guarantee that Ms. Tanner will be able to 
secure employment at all when she receives her degree. She has not 
determined the availability of job openings in her area, nor what 
the actual pay schedules are. 
The court in Wiley v. Wiley. 227 Ut. Adv. Rep. 39 (1993), 
indicated that imputing income in the determination of alimony 
based on potential future income would be pure speculation. The 
alimony award "cannot be premised upon mere conjecture; instead, it 
demands a careful and precise assessment requiring detailed 
findings". Id. 
There can be no detailed findings regarding Ms. Tannerfs 
potential income in two years. To attempt to do so would be 
speculative and pure conjecture. Even if Ms. Tanner has the 
potential to earn $20,000 a year when and if she receives her 
degree, there is no guarantee that she will realize her potential. 
As stated in Wiley, the alimony award and itfs termination cannot 
be premised upon speculation and conjecture. The trial court erred 
is this case by doing just that. 
POINT 6: 
ATTORNEY FEES 
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The trial court abused its discretion in not awarding 
attorney's fees to Ms. Tanner. "In divorce cases, an award of 
attorney fees must be supported by evidence that it is reasonable 
in amount and reasonably needed by the party requesting the award". 
Huck v. HucX, 734 P.2d 417 (Utah 1986); Sinclair v. Sinclair, 718 
P.2d 396 (Utah 1986); Pusev v. Pusev. 728 P.2d 117 (Utah 1986); 
Rasband v. Rasband. 752 P.2d 1331, 1337 (Ut. Ct. App. 1988). 
Ms. Tanner's counsel presented an itemized bill showing the 
reasonableness of the fees for the amount of time spent on the 
case. The fees were shown to be comparable with those of other 
attorneys in the region doing a comparable amount of work. 
Ms. Tanner's financial need of the award of attorney fees was 
also shown. She was a full-time student at the time of trial and 
had no income. Ms. Tanner could not expect to receive another large 
disbursement of money from Tanner Inc. In fact, Maurice Tanner, the 
president of the corporation, and Ms. Tanner's father, informed her 
that the large disbursements were the result of the sale of a 
family business and not likely to be repeated in the future. Ms. 
Tanner had no income on which to rely for her attorney fees. Ms. 
Tanner also testified that she had borrowed money from her Father 
to pay attorney fees. Mr. Swensen on the other hand, operated a 
successful law practice with a monthly income of $5,625. 
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The reasonableness of the fees was shown as well as the 
reasonableness of the need for the award yet the trial court 
ordered each party to bear and be responsible to pay their own 
attorney's fees and costs. This is clearly an abuse of discretion 
on the part of the trial court. 
Ms. Tanner comes now before this Court requesting that she be 
awarded attorney fees on appeal. 
POINT 7: 
CLOSING ARGUMENT DENIED 
The trial court abused its discretion in not allowing 
Plaintiff's counsel to present closing argument and cases relevant 
to the case before the court. 
In Bunnell v. The Industrial Commission of Utah, 740 P.2d 
1331, 31 Utah Adv. Rep. 9 (Utah 1987) , the Utah Supreme Court 
reversed and remanded a decision by an administrative law judge who 
refused to listen to closing argument. When Bunnell^ counsel 
offered argument assessing the evidence before the admission of the 
medical records on which the administrative law judge had made his 
decision, the judge told him to save the argument for rehearingo 
The judge indicated that he had already decided to hold against 
Bunnell without even examining the medical records. 
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In the instant case Ms. Tannerfs counsel was not allowed to 
present argument which would have included a presentation of the 
Jones factors, issues of pre-marital property, pre-inheritance 
property, and an analysis of the property distribution. The Supreme 
Court went on to say in Bunnell, that "every agency has a due 
process right to receive a fair trial in front of a fair tribunal". 
The Supreme Court concluded that, "the administrative law judgefs 
conduct so far diverged from that which would be expected from an 
impartial judge that we agree with plaintiff that his right to due 
process was violated". 
Ms. Tanner's due process rights were violated in the instant 
case just as in Bunnell. Ms. Tannerfs counsel was prepared to 
present case law that dealt with the issues before the court but 
was not allowed to do so. The trial court did not make the alimony 
award or the property distribution according to legal precedent 
that counsel was prepared to present to the court. (Record at 192, 
lines 20-24) 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court abused its discretion by not using the Jones 
factors when making its alimony award, the division of property, 
and in itfs decision not to award attorney fees to Plaintiff. The 
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trial court imputed past income to Ms. Tanner that she will not 
receive in the future in the form of monies earned as an art 
teacher during the summer, and large money disbursements from the 
Tanner family corporation that historically had always been used 
for taxes and a minimal amount used for her personal use. The trial 
court also imputed future income on the presumption that Ms. Tanner 
will complete her Masters Degree program and locate a job that will 
pay her $20,000 a year, clear speculation. These are all clear 
cases of the abuse of the trial court fs discretion that has created 
a serious inequity. 
Ms. Tanner has no income producing property and her only hope 
is to earn a masters degree and find a job. Ms. Tanner has no 
current income on which she can rely. Mr. Swensen is a successful 
tax attorney with a masters degree in accounting, as well as being 
a Certified Public Accountant. His estimated income for the year 
1993 was $67,500. In two years regardless of whether Ms. Tanner has 
employment at the income amount she hopes, the alimony award will 
terminate. She will be left with no income producing property, no 
alimony income and the possibility of no employment. She may be 
forced to become a public charge. 
This will all be the result of the failure of the trial court 
to make an equitable alimony award as well as equitably and fairly 
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distributing the couples property. In addition, Ms. Tanner's 
counsel was prepared to present case law pertaining to the Jones 
factors in issues of property division, support and attorney fees, 
in closing argument, but was not allowed to do so. The court 
refused to protect the rights of the Plaintiff and the judgment of 
the court clearly reflects this refusal. 
Dated this 19th day of August, 1994. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Crippen, McConkie & Cline, LC 
Kathleen McConkie, Esq. 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
This is to certify that on the day of August, 1994, 
two (2) true and correct copies of the foregoing Appellants Brief 
was hand delivered to: 
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Kenneth Okazakl, Esq. 
PRINCE, YEATES & GELDZAHLER 
City Center I, Suite 900 
175 East 400 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah, 84111 
Kathleen McConkie, Esq. 
Attorney for Plaintiff and Appellant, 
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1 1 * * * 
2 I THE COURT: The parties and counsel are present:. 
3 I've now had the opportunity to further consider the 
4
 exhibits received as well as the testimony elicited in this 
5 matter, and I am prepared to rule. 
6 In this matter the parties married on November 22nd, 
7 1974, and they have had four children. One now is, however, 
8 over the age of majority. 
9 The plaintiff is a college graduate attending graduate 
10 school from which she will receive her Masters degree within 
11 the next two years. 
12 The defendant has two graduate degrees, a Masters of 
13 Accountancy and a law degree. 
14 | The parties have each sought a divorce on the grounds 
15 of irreconcilable differences and I have heard sufficient 
16 grounds to grant the divorce to each of the parties on that 
17 basis. 
18 The plaintiff is awarded custody of the minor 
19 children of the parties, subject to reasonable visitation by 
20 the defendant, or in the event reasonable visitation can not 
21 be agreed upon, the Third District Court Commissioner's 
22 recommended schedule will pertain. 
23 J The parties have each retained experts to evaluate 
24 [defendant's law practice. I find that the more credible, 
25 I reliable evaluation is that of Mr. Shields, Exhibit 11, 
i pages 22 and 23, and accordingly adopt the same. 
2 The parties have each submitted proposed distributions 
3 of marital property. I find that the more credible, reliable 
4 distribution proposal to be that of the defendanr at Exhibit 
5 11, tab 1, pages 1 and 2, and accordingly adopt the same. 
6 Based upon the credible, believable evidence, I find, 
7 for purposes of calculation of child support:, the 
8 defendant's gross monrhly income to be $5,625. That is from 
9 Exhibit 11, page 42, which shows a projected annual income 
10 for the year of 1993 of $67,500. Ifve simply divided that 
H by 12. His monthly expenses I find to be $2108. That's 
Exhibit 11, tab 4. That, of course, excludes the $300 in 
donations which the defendant indicates he has not and can 
not pay. 
The evidence establishes the plaintiff's income and 
imputable income to total $1000 per month. That is 
calculated by the determination that she received $8000 
from her distribution of the family cQrporationf she is 
capable of earning $1500 during the summer teaching art, 
and she has received $2500 in student stipend for a total of 
$12,000, divided by 12, equals $1000 per month. Support, 
accordingly, is to be calculated pursuant to the Uniform 
Child Support Guideline based upon those two gross income 
figure amounts. 
















insurance on the children. Each of the parties are ordered 
to pay one-half of any noncovered medical expenses. The 
3 | defendant is to maintain the existing life insurance 
4
 I policies which he has on his own life, designating the 
5 I minor children of the parties as beneficiaries. 
Each party is awarded the respective personal property 
7 J in their possession and each parry is ordered to pay and 
8 satisfy the debts incurred by them since the date of 
9 separation, October 1, 1992. 
10 Given the plaintiff's financial condition, that is, 
11 $1000 per month income, both income and imputable income, 
12 with her expenses at $2885, which I find is the reasonable 
13 figure that is determined by taking Exhibit 6, which is 
14 $3417, deducting therefrom her $372 in donations which she 
15 J can not afford to pay, and deducting therefrom the $160 for 
the "other" category which she could not explain, less the 
support payment which will be approximately what is now 
being paid, that being about $1286, though I have not 
calculated the final figure, the plaintiff has shown a need 
for alimony and the defendant has the ability to pay, but his 
disposable earnings which are $3671 from Exhibit 11, page 
42, less the approximate $1286 in support that he will have 
to pay, less his monthly expenses of approximately $2108, 
he can not pay, in my judgment, any more than he is already 




















1 however, can not receive any less than she is already 
2 receiving,
 ariQ accordingly, I order that the S700 per month 
3| m alimony continue to be paid. However, plaintiff will 
complete her schooling within two years, at which time she 
5
 anticipates that she will be able to earn 520,000 per year 
6
 income. It is my order, therefore, that the alimony will 
7
 terminate at the conclusion of two years from this date, 
8 from the date of the next payment that will, in all 
9 likelihood, be the month of January, January 1. Alimony, 
10 therefore, will terminate two years from that date, and 
n moreover, it will terminate upon the usual happening of 
12 the events such as remarriage by the plaintiff, cohabiting 
13 I with a member of the opposite sex without the benefit of 
marriage, et cetera, 
15 j Given the fact that the defendant will be paying 
16 J the support for these children and given the fact that his 
17 I earnings are considerably more than the plaintiff's, I order 
that he be able to take the tax deductions for the children, 
the minor children, for whom he will be paying support, 
so long as he is current in the payment of that obligation. 
21
 j After the distribution which I have adopted here, 
the plaintiff will be the owner of approximately $92,000 
worth of property in assets, plus she will continue to own 
her eight percent interest in the family corporation, the 
Tanner Family Corporation, which represents a considerable 
1 value in her own right. I am therefore persuaded that she 
2 will not need assistance in the payment of her attorney!s 
3 fees and moreover, I'm persuaded that there's been no 
4 evidentiary basis upon which to make such an order and 
5 I decline to order that attorney's fees be paid by the 
6 defendant or vice-versa. Each party is ordered to pay their 
7 own fees and costs in this matter. 
8 Mr. Okazaki, you prepare the Findings of Fact, 
9 J Conclusions of Law and Decree, submit them to Ms. McConkie 
for approval as to form. 
Are there any questions? 
MR. OKAZAKI: No, sir. 
Oh, one thing. 
14 j MS. McCONKIE: I have one question, your Honor. 
15 j MR. OKAZAKI: On the visitation arrangement, the 
16 | parties stipulated that we should adopt the advisory 
17 language in the Code respecting the access to schools, et 
18 cetera. Does the Court recall that? 
19 THE COURT: I do, and I frankly wanted to leave it at 
20 reasonable on the assumption that the parties might expand 
21 that, but that's the reason I say that if they are not able 
22 to expand it by agreement, then that schedule will pertain. 
23 MR. OKAZAKI: What I'm talking about is the advisory 
24 language. 






MS. McCONKIE: Your Honor, the plaintiff would like 
to have her maiden name restored. 
THE COURT: She may certainly have it. 
MS. McCONKIE: Thank you, and in terms of the life 
insurance policy, could she be one-half beneficiary for at 
least the term of the alimony and could the children be 
one-half beneficiary and she could as well, for the term o: 
the alimony? 
THE COURT: No, no, I'm not persuaded that's either 
appropriate or necessary, counsel. She has considerable 
property in her own right. I'm concerned about the 
protection of the children, not the protection of the 
plaintiff here. 
MS. McCONKIE: Thank you, your Honor. 
THE COURT: All right, counsel. We111 be in recess. 
(Whereupon, the proceedings were concluded.) 
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7 I I, ANNA M. BENNETT, do hereby certify: 
8 Thar I am a Certified Shorthand Reporter, License No. 
9 220, and one of the official court reporters of the state 
10 of Utah; that on the 16th day of December, 1993, I attended 
11 the within matter and reported in shorthand the proceedings 
12 had thereat; that later I caused my said shorthand 
13 proceedings to be transcribed into typewriting, and the 
14 foregoing pages, numbered from 2 to 7, inclusive, constitute 
15 a full, true and correct account of the Judge!s Ruling, 
16 to the best of my ability. 
17 DATED at Salt Lake City, Utah, this 20th day of 
18 December, 1993. 
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Kenneth Okazaki, #3844 
PRINCE, YEATES & GELDZAHLER 
Attorney for Defendant 
City Centre I, Suite 900 
175 East Fourth South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 524-1000 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
MAURIA T. SWENSEN 
Plaintiff, : AMENDED DECREE OF DIVORCE 
v. 
: Civil No. 924902803DA 
: Honorable Dennis J. Frederick 
JAMES G. SWENSEN, JR., : 
Defendant. : 
This matter came on for Trial on the 16th day of December at 
10:00 a.m. in the Third Judicial District Court, the Honorable 
Dennis J. Frederick, Third District Court Judge, presiding. 
Witnesses testified, exhibits were received, argument of the 
counsel was considered, file and pleadings were reviewed, the Court 
being thereby fully informed, having heretofore entered its 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and being otherwise fully 
advised in the premises, now therefore, it is hereby: 
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED: 
1. The parties are mutually awarded a Decree of Divorce, to 
become final and absolute as of the date of December 16, 1993, upon 
the date of signing and entry thereof by the Court pursuant to the 
provisions of U.C.A. § 30-3-7 (1953 as amended). 
CHILDREN 
2. The Plaintiff is hereby awarded custody of the minor 
children subject to reasonable visitation by the Defendant. 
VISITATION 
3. The minimum visitation schedule shall be as set forth in 
§ 30-3-35 of the Utah Code Ann, including the following: 
a. one weekday evening to be specified by the 
noncustodial parent from 5:30 p.m. until 8:30 p.m.; 
b. alternating weekends beginning on the first weekend 
after the entry of the decree from 6:00 p.m. on 
Friday until 7:00 p.m. on Sunday continuing each 
year; 
c. holidays take precedence over the weekend 
visitation, and changes shall not be made to the 
regular rotation of the alternating weekend 
visitation schedule; 
d. in years ending in an odd number, the noncustodial 
parent is entitled to visitation on Human Rights 
Day, Easter, Memorial Day, July 24th, Veteran's 
Day, Day before or after each child's birthday from 
3:00 p.m. to 9:00 p.m. and the first half of 
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Christmas Vacation, including Christmas Eve and 
Christmas Day to 1:00 p.m. 
e. in years ending in an even number, the noncustodial 
parent is entitled to visitation on New Year's Day, 
President's Day, July 4th until 11:00 p.m., Labor 
Day, Columbus Day, UEA weekend from Wed. 6:00 p.m. 
to Sun. 7:00 p.m., each child's actual birthday 
beginning at 3:00 p.m. until 9:00 p.m., including 
taking the other siblings along for the birthday, 
Thanksgiving from Wed. 7:00 p.m. to Sun. 7:00 p.m., 
and the second half of Christmas Vacation, 1:00 
p.m. to 9:00 p.m. Christmas Day; 
f. Father's Day shall be spent with the father every 
year; 
g. Mother's Day shall be spent with the mother every 
year; 
h. extended visitation with the noncustodial parent 
shall be four weeks of consecutive visitation 
during the summer at the option of the noncustodial 
parent; or, if year round, 1/2 of the vacation time 
for year-round school breaks, custodial parent 
allowed two week uninterrupted; 
i. notification of extended visitation or vacation 
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weeks with the children shall be provided at least 
30 days in advance to the other parent; and 
j. telephone contact shall be at reasonable hours. 
4, The advisory guidelines as stated in § 30-3-33 of the 
Utah Code Ann, are hereby adopted and include the following: 
a. visitation shall be utilized to maximize the 
continuity and stability of the children's lives; 
b. special consideration shall be given by each parent 
to make the children available to attend family 
functions including funerals, weddings, family 
reunions, religious holidays, important ceremonies, 
and other significant events in the lives of the 
children or in the life of either parent which may 
inadvertently conflict with the visitation 
schedule; 
c. the noncustodial parent shall pick up the children 
at the times specified and return the children at 
the times specified, and the children's regular 
school hours shall not be interrupted; 
d. the custodial parent shall have the children ready 
for visitation at the time they are to be picked up 
and shall be present at the custodial home or shall 
make reasonable alternate arrangements to receive 
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the children at the time they are returned; 
e. neither visitation nor child support shall be 
withheld due to either parent's failure to comply 
with a court-ordered visitation schedule; 
f. the custodial parent shall notify the non-custodial 
parent within 24 hours of receiving notice of all 
significant school, social, sports, religious, and 
community functions in which the children are 
participating or being honored, and the 
noncustodial parent shall be entitled to attend and 
participate fully; 
g. the noncustodial parent shall have access directly 
to all school reports including preschool and 
daycare reports and medical records and shall be 
notified immediately by the custodial parent in the 
event of a medical emergency; 
h. each parent shall provide the other with their 
current address and telephone number within 24 
hours of any change; 
i. each parent shall permit and encourage liberal 
telephone contact during reasonable hours and 
uncensored mail privileges with the children; 
j . parental care shall be presumed to be better care 
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for the children than surrogate care and the 
parties shall cooperate in allowing the 
noncustodial parent, if willing and able, to 
provide child care; 
k. each parent shall provide all surrogate care 
providers with the name, current address, and 
telephone number of the other parent and shall 
provide the noncustodial parent with the name, 
current address, and telephone number of all 
surrogate care providers unless the court for good 
cause orders otherwise; and 
1. each parent shall be entitled to an equal division 
of major religious holidays celebrated by the 
parents, and the parent who celebrates a religious 
holiday that the other parent does not celebrate 
shall have the right to be together with the 
children on the religious holiday. 
PERSONAL PROPERTY 
5. The parties7 property is awarded as follows: 
a. The Plaintiff is awarded $374.15 of the USAA money 
market account (account no. 42901560486) with the remaining 
balance awarded to the Defendant free and clear of any claim 
by the Plaintiff. 
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b. The Defendant is awarded $895.86 of the 1992 Tax 
Refund with the remaining balance awarded to the Plaintiff 
free and clear of any claim by the Defendant. 
c. The Franklin Telecom and Mining Services securities 
are awarded to the Defendant free and clear of any claim by 
the Plaintiff. 
d. Plaintiff is awarded the personal property in her 
possession valued at approximately $5,000 less any exclusions 
pursuant to the terms of this Order. 
e. Plaintiff is awarded the 1990 Caravan, 1985 Reliant, 
and the 1981 Reliant free and clear of any claim by the 
Defendant. 
f. Defendant is awarded the 1992 Honda Accord free and 
clear of any claim by the Plaintiff. 
g. Plaintiff is awarded the marital residence located at 
2615 East Lincoln Lane, Salt Lake City, Utah, together with 
the sole responsibility for any obligation owing thereon, free 
and clear of any claim by the Defendant. 
h. Defendant is awarded the proceeds from the contract 
sale of the Crest Drive property free and clear from any claim 
by the Plaintiff. 
i. Defendant is awarded his professional practice free 
and clear from any claim by the Plaintiff• 
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j. Plaintiff is awarded the Dreyfus IRA account 
(account no. 039-0560055352) in the amount of $3,359.34 free 
and clear of any claim by Defendant. 
1. Defendant is awarded the Dreyfus IRA account 
(account no. 039-0556358836) in the amount of $6,717.55 free 
and clear of any claim by Plaintiff. 
m. Plaintiff is awarded $3,138.23 from the USAA money 
market account (account no. 42901704138) with the remaining 
balance awarded to the Defendant free and clear of any claim 
by the Plaintiff. 
n. Plaintiff is awarded $508.96 from the USAA CRST 
account (account no. 51902459719) with the remaining balance 
awarded to the Defendant free and clear of any claim by the 
Plaintiff. 
o. Plaintiff is awarded $1,064.18 from the USAA Gold 
account (account no. 50901211141) with the remaining balance 
awarded to the Defendant free and clear of any claim by the 
Plaintiff. 
p. Plaintiff is awarded $16,519.00 from the investment 
note with the remaining interest awarded to the Defendant free 
and clear of any claim by the Plaintiff. 
q. Plaintiff is awarded $1,723.00 from the FEGB Ltd. 
Partnership with the remaining interest awarded to the 
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Defendant free and clear of any claim by the Plaintiff. 
DISTRIBUTION OF RETIREMENT ACCOUNTS 
6. The retirement accounts shall be divided pursuant to a 
Qualified Domestic Relations Order within the meaning of §414(p) of 
the Internal Revenue Code of 1986. 
DEFENDANT'S INCOME 
7. The Defendant has a gross monthly income of $5,625 and 
monthly expenses of $2,108. 
PLAINTIFF'S INCOME 
8. The Court hereby imputes income to the Plaintiff in the 
amount of $1,000 per month and monthly expenses of $2,885. 
CHILD SUPPORT 
9. Child support calculated pursuant to the uniform child 
support guidelines and based upon the gross income for the 
Defendant of $5,625 per month and the gross income of $1,000 
attributable to the Plaintiff is $1,209.55 per month to be paid by 
the Defendant to the Plaintiff. 
HEALTH INSURANCE 
10. The Defendant shall maintain health and accident 
insurance for the minor children and shall deduct the premium from 
the child support amount. Each of the parties shall be ordered to 
pay one-half of any non-covered medical expenses. 
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LIFE INSURANCE 
11. The Defendant shall maintain his existing life insurance 
policy which he presently has on his own life and shall designate 
the minor children as beneficiaries thereunder. 
PERSONAL PROPERTY 
12. Each party shall be awarded their respective personal 
property presently in their possession except as specifically 
divided pursuant to the terms hereof. 
13• Defendant is awarded the piano, antique sewing machine, 
and remodeling tools presently in the possession of the Plaintiff. 
DEBTS AND OBLIGATIONS 
14. Each party shall pay and satisfy the personal debts 
incurred by them since the date of separation, October 1, 1992, and 
shall indemnify and hold the other harmless therefrom. 
ALIMONY 
15. The Defendant shall pay the Plaintiff the sum of $700 per 
month in alimony commencing January l, 1994, which shall terminate 
automatically on January 1, 1996. 
16. Further, alimony shall terminate, in addition to the 
terms as stated above, upon the re-marriage of the Plaintiff, the 
Plaintiff residing with a person of the opposite sex without the 
benefit of marriage or any other statutory or legal grounds for 
termination of alimony. 
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TAX EXEMPTIONS 
17. The Defendant is awarded the tax deductions for the minor 
children for whom he will be paying support so long as he is 
current in the payment of that support obligation. 
ATTORNEY'S FEES 
18. Each party shall bear and be responsible to pay their own 
attorney's fees and costs incurred herein. 
MAIDEN NAME 
19. The Plaintiff is hereby restored to the use of her maiden 
name of "Tanner." 
DATED t h i s Z^y'd day of ~7?^C' .1* - ' / 1994. 
C 
BY THE COURT: 
i ~A 
Dennis J. Frederick 
THIRD DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
APPROVED AS TO FORM AND CONTENT: 
Kathleen McConki'e 
Attorney for the Plaintiff 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the day of February, 1994, a 
true and correct copy of the foregoing Decree of Divorce was hand-
delivered to the following: 
Kathleen McConkie 
1200 Beneficial Life Tower 
36 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Ingrid S. Westphal 
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TabC 
In the Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County 
STATE OF UTAH 
Maur ia T. Swensen 
Plaintiff 
vs. 








Case No.. 92^902303DA 
Financial Declaration 
. J u l y 1 5 , 1993 Dated 
Wife: Mauria T. Swensen 
Address: 261.5 E a s t L i n c o l n Lane 
S a l t Lake C i t y , UT ^ 1 2 4 
Soc. Sec. No.: 5 3 5 - 2 ^ - 2 ^ 7 
Occupation: S t u d e n t 
Employer: n / a 
Birthdate: May 1 7 , 195** 
NOTE: THIS DECLARATION MUST BE FILED WITH THE DOMESTIC CALENDAR CLERK 5 DAYS 
PRIOR TO THE PRE-TRIAL HEARING. 
FAILURE BY EITHER PARTY TO COMPLETE, PRESENT, AND FILE THIS FORM AS REQUIRED WILL 
AUTHORIZE THE COURT TO ACCEPT THE STATEMENT OF THE OTHER PARTY AS THE BASIS FOR 
ITS DECISION. 
ANY FALSE STATEMENT MADE HEREON SHALL SUBJECT YOU TO THE PENALTY FOR 
PERJURY AND MAY BE CONSIDERED A FRAUD UPON THE COURT. 
STATEMENT OF INCOME, EXPENSES, ASSETS AND LIABILITIES 
(NOTE: To arr ive at monthly figures when income is received and 
deductions are made weekly, multiplYJ)y 4.3; if figures are on a bi-weekly 
basis, multiply by 2.167) 
1. Gross monthly income from: 
Salary and wages, including commissions, bonuses, 
allowances and overtime, payable (pay 
period) 
Pensions and retirement 
Social security 
Disability and unemployment insurance 
Public assistance (welfare, AFDC payment, etc.). 
Child support from any prior marriage 
Dividends and interest 
Rents 
All other sources: (Specify). 
TOTAL MONTHLY INCOME _ 
Itemize monthly deductions from gross income: 
State and federal income taxes 
Number of exemptions taken 
Social security 
Medical or other insurance (describe fully). 
Union or other dues 












TOTAL MONTHLY DEDUCTIONS 
3. Net monthly income - take home pay 
1 $ 1$ 
$ 1$ 
4. Debts and obligations: 





TOTAL ! S ! $ 
(If insufficient space, insert total and attach schedule) 
5. All propeny of the parties known to me owned individually or jointly (indicate who holds or how title held: (H) Husband, (W) Wife, (J) Jointly). 
WHERE SPACE IS INSUFHCIENT FOR COMPLETE INFORMATION OR LISTLNG PLEASE ATTACH SEPARATE SCHEDULE. 
Value Owed Thereon 
(a) Household furnishings, furniture, 
appliances and equipment 
(b) Automobile (Year-Make) 1 9 9 0 D^d^e C a r a v a n 





(c) Securities - stocks, bonds 
(d) Cash and Deposit Accounts (banks, savings & loans, 
credit unions - savings and checking) 





1 1 1 
(e) Life Insurance: 
Name of Company Policv No. Face Amount 
$ $ 
Cash value, accumulated 
dividend, or loan amount 
(f) Profit sharing or Retirement Accounts 
Name 
Name 
Value of interest and amount presently vested 
(g) Other Personal Property and Assets (specify) 
Real Estate (Where more than one parcel of real estate owned, attach sheet with identical information for all additional property) 
Address. 
Original Cost S 
Cost of Additions $ 
Total Cost $ 
Mtg. Balance S 
Other Liens S 
Equity S 
Type of Property 
Date of Acquisition 
Total Present Value S_ 
Basis of Valuation 
Monthly Amortization . 
Taxes $ 
And to whom 
Individual contributions 
Business Interest (indicate name, share, type of business value less indebtedness) 
Other assets (Specify) 
Total monthly expenses: *(Specify which party is the custodial parent and list name and relationship of all members of the household whose 
expenses are included.) 
* Mauria S wens en ( c u s t o d i a l isarent^ 
Daughters (Al ison, Clare) 
Sons (Nate, Tanner) 
HUSBAND 
S 
Rent or mortaase payments (residence) ' 




Real property insurance (residence) • ' 
Maintenance (residence) ! 1 -* * 
Food and household supplies ! ! -' * '. .. 
Utilities including water, electricity, gas and heat 
Entertainment (includes clubs, social obligations, travel recreation). 
Incidentals (grooming, tobacco, alcohol, gifts, and donations) 
Transportation (other than automobile) 
Auto expense (gas, oil, repair, insurance) 
Auto payments 
Installment payment(s). (Insert total and attach itemized schedule 
if not fully set forth in (d) on the first page hereof) 
Other expenses (Insert total and specify on attached schedule). 
TOT AT FYPPNKPS 
I ' O . T ) 
Telephone 




Insurance (life, accident, comprehensive liabilitv. disability) Exclude Pavroll Deducted * 
Child Care ! 
Payment of child spousal support re: prior marriage 1 
School i 















husband's ( ) Wife's ( x ) 
Proposed Settlement of Pending 
Divorce Litigation 
Child Support $ Total (per month) S 
Alimony: Total (per month) $ 1 , ^ 0 0 . 0 0 
Property Distribution: 
Maur ia Swens5en: 
Jewelry (gifts to me ). Pistol (gift from my father). Sewing equipmant. Honda car. 
Silver (gift from my grandmother). Tools and all yard equipment for yard and home 
upkeep (defendant has an apartment). Art (my personal art work). Furnishings and 
accessories presently in the home (to maintain more stability for the children, to 
maintain the home, because I personally acquired most of the furnishings by babysitting 
or my parents gave things to us. King bed. Chest. Nightstand, Lamp. Sofa. 2 chair; 
2 tables. Linen chest. Desk. 2 Lamps. Microwave. Dining set. Kitchen set. TV and 
VCR. Entertainment center. Barbequer. Refrigerator. Washer and dryer. Household 
equipment and; supplies. Children's personal furnishings and equipment. Home at 
Lincoln Lane. Defendant pays all attorney fees incurred during entire divorce proceedii 
Defendant pays all taxes, penalities, and interest for 1992 state and federal taxes. 
S^le custody of all four of our children. Half of all marital assets, his business 
included. All^w me to take at least two of the four children as deductions on tax 
returns. 
GRAND TOTAL (per month) S. 
I, VVCUA/4H (A T ^ V l ^ 4 ^ A o 4 0
 9 propose the above settlement. 
Plaintiff/Defendant 
If this matter requires a trial, it will take approximately hours and witnesses will 
be called for this party. 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE 
ss. 
I swear that the matters stated herein are true and correct, 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this ' s ) n 1 -
day of ^ f-LLM iJlJ 
.19 9 8 
CYNTHIA EOTXWCOIL 
Notary Public 
STATE OF UTAH 
is} My Commission Expire* 
$ March 11.1994 
402SSW«ighad.Sl£ UT 84124 _ 
m u u u u • u J J i i ijfly Commission Expires: 
Notary Public residing in Salt Lake County, Utah 
^.//•W 
BRING TO THE PRE-TRIAL HEARING ALL DOCUMENTS AND OTHER SUPPORTING INFORMATION 
NECESSARY TO VERIFY OR EXPLAIN THE STATEMENTS MADE IN THIS DECLARATION. INCLUDING 
BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PAYROLL STUBS FOR THE MOST RECENT 90 DAYS, 3 MOST RECENT TAX 
RETURNS, CREDIT UNION SHARE STATEMENTS, PASSBOOKS, CHECKBOOKS, CANCELLED CHECKS. 
CERTIFICATES, POLICIES AND OTHER RELEVANT AND MATERIAL DOCUMENTATION. 
TabD 
In the Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County 
STATE OF UTAH 
M AixA-fA r. £ D <TA) S/rAJ 
Plaintiff 
vs. 
•TAMPS 6. SoJetOSsr/O.r* 
Defendant 
Husband: SAMCS 6 ^ ) f A / i f / ; . t f , 
AIMTRW P.O. &'* /99/ 
SALT LAKtr CJTY.cJrAtf SW/6 







f£&. 23. f<fSe> 








Dated: AU& . '3. {?<?* 
SW£AJ f€T*/ 
2J>tf IrtiOstN IA+J6 
S4LT LA£€ 
.: XBS-1* 






NOTE: THIS DECLARATION MUST BE FILED WITH THE DOMESTIC CALENDAR CLERK 5 DAYS 
PRIOR TO THE PRE-TRIAL HEARING. 
FAILURE BY EITHER PARTY TO COMPLETE, PRESENT, AND FILE THIS FORM AS REQUIRED WILL 
AUTHORIZE THE COURT TO ACCEPT THE STATEMENT OF THE OTHER PARTY AS THE BASIS FOR 
ITS DECISION. 
ANY FALSE STATEMENT MADE HEREON SHALL SUBJECT YOU TO THE PENALTY FOR 
PERJURY AND MAY BE CONSIDERED A FRAUD UPON THE COURT. 
STATEMENT OF INCOME, EXPENSES, ASSETS AND LIABILITIES 
(NOTE: To arrive at monthly figures when income is received and 
deductions are made weekly, multiply by 4 .3; if figures are on a bi-weekly 
basis, multiply by 2.167) 
1. Gross monthly income from; 
Salary and wages, including commissions, bonuses, 
allowances and overtime, payable _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ (pay 
Period) _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ » _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ - _ - _ 
Pensions and retirement 
Social securiry 
Disability and unemployment insurance 
Public assistance (welfare, AFDC payment, etc.). 
Child support from any prior marriage 
Dividends and interest 
Rents 
All other sources: (Specify). 
TOTAL MONTHLY INCOME _ 
Itemize monthly deductions from gross income: 
State and federal income taxes 
Number of exemptions taken 
Social security 
Medical or other insurance (describe fully). 
Union or other dues . 








r.6 2S.ot> ) A b7 .IS 
1 / 
1 Y 3 a . 3 r 
I s $ 
! 
*hen (specify), 
TOTAL MONTHLY DEDUCTIONS 






L Debts and obligations: 







TOTAL l* _^L_L* 
(If insufficient space, insert to til and attach schedule) 
5. All property of the parties known io me owned individually or jointly (indicate who holds or how title held: (H) Husband, (W) Wife, (J) Jointly). 
WHERE SPACE IS INSUFFICIENT FOR COMPLETE INFORMATION OR LISTING PLEASE ATTACH SEPARATE SCHEDULE. 
(a) Household furnishings, furniture. (j4) 
appliances and equipment (&>} 
(b) Automobile (Year-Make) /99 Z HetfQA (rt) 
/91* #*&££ (iol 
/9QS PLYteUTX (H) 
Value 
$ 7&0*o* 
/ V 2S"0.o* 
X 9oo ** 







(c) Securities - stocks, bonds 
Mi»w& $szi4<^r<-
T*tKlK)£A .TAN*- . 
2.** *U (Tl 





(d) Cash and Deposit Accounts (banks, savings &. loans, 
credit unions - savings and checking) 
l/SM AtMGV MAfKe-T 71Z.U 
(e) Life Insurance: 
Name of Company Policy No. Face Amount 
S 1+06, oob $ 4~ 
Cash value, accumulated 
dividend, or loan amount 
fgAM 
(0 Profit sharing or Retirement Accounts 
Name tM* Ql£Y{ut JA*rs rtucj0&e») C6-3*-U) 
Name Ik* * DfiXY fu* A W / I / A Su£A)S>Z*S (£>'$*'?*) 
(g) Other Personal Property and Assets (specify) 
PA ~ C45AK tf/H /6-So-W) 
Value of interest and amount presently vested 
3*31.8/ 
vr.aJLf 47 / \ 11° 
Aa.-Jj A3 ¥16.74 
Real P^»t» (Where more than one parcel of real estate owned, aaach sheet with identical informabon for all additional property) 
TVPC of Property X£S 11> S?A) C^T Address 7U-/ £ 
SAL.T 
Oripnai Cost $ , _ J 
Cost of Additions S 
Total CostS 
Mtg. Balance $ 
Other Liens X ,
 m ,, 
Equity $ 




* 6B St* 
Date of Acquisition _ JTHJLL* \°l6Z 
Tctal Present Value $ *pf/u>tAs*J u~ f)A^>^^L^ 
Basis of Valuatioa 
And to whom 
Individual contributions 
) Business interest (indicate name, share, type of business value less indebtedness) 
Other assets (Specify) 
//.*&-*+ 
Total monthly expenses: *(Specify which party is the custodial parent and list name and relationship of all members of the household whose 
expenses are included.) 
* /to) 4 £-uLSt*<l>U /0e>*4~3~ 
AL/Mo»Y 
CL-HtLD StA-PA>*r 
Rent or mortgage payments (residence) _,.., _ 
Real property taxes (residence) 
Real property insurance (residence) 
Maintenance (residence) 
Food and household supplies 
Utilities including water, electricity, gas and heat 
Telephone 




Insurance (life, accident, comprehensive liability, disability) Exclude Payroll Deducted 
Child Care . 
Payment of child spousal support rt: prior marriage 
School 
Entertainment (includes clubs, social obligations, travel recreation) .,.„„ . . „ 
Incidentals (grooming, tobacco, alcohol, gifts, and donations)
 m 
Transportation (other than automobile) 
Auto expense ($as. oil. repair, insurance) 
Auto payments 
Installment payment(s). (Insert total and attach itemized schedule 
if not fully set forth in (d) on the firsr page hereof) 
HUSBAND 
$ ? €>& . *0 
/.</9S.** 


















Husband's (^) Wife's ( ) 
Proposed Settlement of Pending 
Divorce Litigation 
Child Supports Total (per month) $ /</9B.*e> 
Alimony: f*R f ySARS Total (permonth) $ ? '* • oe> 
Property Distribution: 
/SSAA Ms^; At^le./- ^J> Sac*^;{•/•£* • eL^U a w A 
Ji'Ajd'* ^U^U» /f,*^ <X~o*^J*J £ M*~»fl/; ' / 
' • " " - ' — = — — * *«-=* — 5 5 
XA/> • JA*<r? Su>£klS€V au+s~*>LJ- £ £>{At~d4uA 
£AA • Mrf»Arf Stuexfrs/ *SAAJ*J £ S^Jf^/ 
PA #e.C0#AJ.lfr A^JtuJzJ £ A ^ * * U ~ . J ~ 
GRAND TOTAL (per month) S 2 / V& . +» 
, propose the above settlement. 
( /CUMJ* />- At^^<j^ ,y^ 
/ ftfflj^f/Defendant 
If this matter requires a trial, it will take approximately hours and witnesses will 
«« • .*• t^_ • „ . . 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE 
I swear that the matters stated herein are true and correct, 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this /(/Z? day of. 
Notary Public 
NE k BROOKS 
1 
JOANNES I 
215 South State #800 I 
Salt Lake City.Utah 84111 ! 
My Commission Expires I 
June 27. 1995 I 
State of Utah J 
< £ ^ j=. 
^ * ^ L ^f 
A* £2 
^^^^y 
otary Public residing in Salt Lake County, Utah 
My Commission Expires: J27. ,/f ?S~ 
BRING TO THE PRE-TRIAL HEARING ALL DOCUMENTS AND OTHER SUPPORTING INFORMATION 
NECESSARY TO VERIFY OR EXPLAIN THE STATEMENTS MADE IN THIS DECLARATION, INCLUDING 
BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PAYROLL STUBS FOR THE MOST RECENT 90 DAYS, 3 MOST RECENT TAX 
RETURNS. CREDIT UNION SHARE STATEMENTS, PASSBOOKS. CHECKBOOKS. CANCELLED CHECKS. 
CERTIFICATES, POLICIES AND OTHER RELEVANT AND MATERIAL DOCUMENTATION. 
TabE 
PLAINTIFF'S EXBODBTT 10 
Kathleen McConkie (3978) 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
1200 Beneficial Life Tower 
3 6 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Telephone: (801)537-1508 
Telefax: (801)328-3629 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 








| AFFIDAVIT OF 
i ATTORNEY FEES 
i Case No. 924902803DA 
i Judge Dennis Frederick 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: SS 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
I, Kathleen McConkie, Esq., being first duly sworn, deposes 
and states as follows: 
1. I am the attorney of record in the above-entitled matter. 
2. I primarily practise in the area of Domestic Relations 
and have done so for the last ten (10) years. 
3. I charge $130.00 an hour. 
4. It is my belief the fees and rate are reasonable in the 
Affidavit Of Attorney Fees 
Judge Dennis Frederick 
Page 1 swensen.fee 
community. 
5. I have spent approximately 3 0 hours in travel, 
consultation with client, court appearances, and the drafting of 
pleadings in the above regard to trial. The fees to date are 
$4,990.40. 
6. I anticipate that I will bill 3 0 additional hours, which 
will include the month of December, the trial and final orders, 
etc. 
7. Supplemental attorney's fees will, therefore, 
approximately total $10,000.00. 
8. Further affiant saith not. 
DATED this/SW^.day of December, 1993. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Kathleen McConkie 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this j& ay of December, 1993. 
NOTARY PUBUC | 
STEVEN E. WRIGHT • 
1 ffSEffii 2702 SO WOOD HOLLOW WAY 1 
1 ttlKl BOUNTIFUL, LTT 84010 • 
My Commission Expires Apr 14,199? | 
State of Utah -
•Notary Public 
'#&</?- fcpfa&A't 
Affidavit Of Attorney Fees 
Judge Dennis Frederick 
Page 2 swensen.fee 
CERTIFICATE OP DELIVERY 
I c e r t i f y t h a t on the day of December, 1993, I hand 
d e l i v e r e d a copy of t h e foregoing document t o t h e fo l lowing: 
Kenneth A. Okazaki, Esq. 
175 East 400 South, #900 
S a l t Lake Ci ty , UT 84111 
Aff idavi t Of Attorney Fees 
Judge Dennis Frederick 
Page 3 lawrence.118 
Kathleen McConkie 
Beneficial Life Tower, Suite 1200 
3 6 South State 
Salt Lake City UT 84111 
Invoice submitted to: 
Ms. Mauria Swensen 
2615 East Lincoln Lane 
Salt Lake City UT 84124 




07/09/93 Research. Review file. Phone call 
to opposing counse. 
07/29/93 Discovery preparation. 
07/30/93 Telephone conference with client. 
Correspondence to Kenneth Okazaki. 
08/11/93 Telephone call to opposing counsel, 
Review file. 
























Ms. Mauria Swensen 
08/18/93 Call from Ken Okazaki. 
08/19/93 Conference with opposing party. 
Pre-trial conference with client, 
08/25/93 Call from opposing counsel, 
08/30/93 Telephone conference with Kenneth 
Okazaki. 
08/31/93 Meeting with Ken Okazaki. 
09/02/93 Conference with client. Review of 
Discovery. 
09/21/93 Meeting with opposing counsel. 
Meeting with Wayne Mills. 
09/27/93 Call from Kenneth Okazaki. 
For professional services rendered 
Additional charges: 
08/16/93 Three pages of faxes received from Ken 














































Ms* Mauria Swensen Page 3 
Amount 
08/18/93 Ten pages of fax sent to Kenneth Okazaki @ 13.00 
$1.30 per page. 
08/27/93 Three pages of fax sent to Ken Okazaki @ 3.90 
$1.30 per page. 
Total costs $17.65 
Total amount of this bill 






Beneficial Life Tower, Suite 1200 
3 6 South State 
Salt Lake City UT 84111 
Invoice submitted to: 
Ms, Mauria Swensen 
2615 East Lincoln Lane 
Salt Lake City UT 84124 
November 5, 1993 
Invoice #10081 
Professional services 
10/07/93 Modify documents. Call to Ken 
Okazaki. 
10/11/93 Review of stipulation. Re-draft. 
Telephone call from Ken Okazaki. 
10/12/93 Review second stipulation. 
Redraft documents. 
10/15/93 Call to opposing counsel. 

























Ms. Mauria Swensen 
10/28/93 Draft documents, 
For professional services rendered 
Additional charges: 









Total costs $1,000.00 




Balance due $2,085.65 
Kathleen McConkie 
Beneficial Life Tower, Suite 1200 
3 6 South State 
Salt Lake City UT 84111 
Invoice submitted to: 
Ms. Mauria Swensen 
2615 East Lincoln Lane 
Salt Lake City UT 84124 
December 8, 1993 
Invoice #10120 
Professional services 
11/04/93 Review of documents. Discovery. 
11/09/93 Telephone call from Kenneth 
Okazaki. Discussion regarding 
settlement. 
11/23/93 Trial preparation. 
11/29/93 Trial preparation. Telephone call 















For professional services rendered 
Additional charges: 
5.70 $741.00 
11/20/93 Invoice from Wayne Mills for detailed letter 112.50 
regarding needed tax and accounting matters. 
Ms. Mauria Swensen Page 2 
Amount 
12/01/93 Two pages of fax to Okazaki @ $1.30 per 2.60 
page. 
12/03/93 Fourteen pages of fax to Wayne Mills, CPA @ 18.20 
$1.30 per page. 
Two pages of fax to Kenneth Okazaki @ $1.3 0 2.60 
per page. 
12/06/93 Three pages of fax to Ken Okazaki @ $1.30 3.90 
per page. 
Pedal Express to Kenneth Okazaki1s and Wayne 23.95 
Mill's offices. 
Total costs $163.75 
Total amount of this bill $904.75 
Previous balance $2,085.65 
Balance due $2,990.40 
TabF 
A I am. 
Q Would you tell the Court what you're doing? 
A I am studying at getting my master's degree at the 
University of Utah. 
Q What are you getting your master's in? 
A In recreational therapy. 
Q Do you have an estimate of how long it will take 
for you to complete this master's degree? 
A I should be finished in two more years from this 
month. 
Q Have you worked — when were you married to the 
Defendant? 
A Pardon me? 
Q I'm sorry. When were you married to the Defendant? 
A On November 22nd, 1974. 
Q During that time have you worked outside of the 
home? 
A Yes, I worked while Jim was in law school. 
Q And when was Jim in law school? 
A '79, he started in 1979. 
Q Did you work the entire time he was in law school? 
A Yes. 
Q What did you do? 
A I worked as a graduate assistant for a professor on 
campus and I did some secretarial work for him. Mostly I was 
23 
able to bring the work home so that I could be home with my 
children. 
Q Was this at BYU? 
A It was. 
Q And do you recall what you earned? 
A I'm not sure. I think it's about $6 an hour as a 
graduate student. 
Q Did you work full-time? 
A I did not. 
Q Do you have children, Ms. Swensen? 
A I do. 
Q How many children do you have? 
A I have four children. 
Q Could you tell the Court their names and ages, 
please? 
A Allison is 18, Nathan is 17, Claire is 13, anc 
Tanner is 9. 
Q Do you own property? Do you own real property, 
land or houses? 
A Yes. 
Q Can you tell the Court what you own? 
A I own jointly with Mr. Swensen a home in Orem and 
the home that I'm presently living in. 
Q Were those pieces of property purchased during the 
marriage? 
24 
1 Q Do you owe your father $3,000? 
2 A I do. 
3 Q Are you going to have to pay him back? 
4 A Yes, I am. 
5 Q And when did he loan you the $3,000? 
6 A Pardon me? 
7 Q When did he loan you — 
8 A When? In 1992 after July and in the fall. 
9 Q What purpose was that why he loaned you the money? 
10 A He loaned me the money, 2,000 of it, to pay attor-
11 ney's fees and a thousand to pay him back for a personal 
12 loan. 
13 Q Did you pay that $3,000 to your — the $2,000 to 
14 your attorneys? 
15 A I did. 
16 Q How much did you pay prior to the time of your 
17 coming to me? 
18 A Just under $5,000. 
19 Q Could you tell me how many attorneys you've had in 
20 this case? 
21 A You're my third attorney. 
22
 Q And would you like to explain to the Court why you 
23
 had needed three attorneys? 
\ A I've needed three attorneys because of all of the 
25 I 
complications of the case and they have not been able to have 
35 
A Yes. 
Q Is it true and correct to the best of your 
knowledge? 
A It is. 
Q Has your lifestyle changed since you've been sepa-
rated from the Defendant? 
A It has. 
Q And these things, the differences in your 
lifestyle? 
A Yes. 
Q I've noticed that you have put down here school 
clothes and furniture from thrift store. 
A Uh-huh (affirmative). 
Q Have you bought — have you not been able to buy 
clothes for the children at a regular department store? 
A I haven't. 
Q What about for yourself, have you been able to buy 
any clothes for yourself? 
A I have purchased some for them but we have supple-
mented also. 
Q Have you taken any vacations? 
A I have. 
Q Where have you gone? 
A I went to Phoenix in the spring. My mother lives 
there. 
39 
Q Did you take the children with you? 
A I didn't. 
Q Let's go to Plaintiff's Exhibit 9. 
Mrs. Swensen, do you presently have life insurance? 
A I don't. 
Q Are you in need of life insurance? 
A I am. 
Q Do you presently have health insurance? 
A Through Mr. Swensen's business. 
Q Have you checked with Mr. Swensen's insurance 
carrier to see if there's a Cobra policy? 
A It is. 
Q Is there a Cobra policy? 
A I'm not able to continue with that policy. 
Q So as soon as you're divorced, will you be in need 
of health insurance? 
A I will. 
Q Mrs. Swensen, are you presently in need of 
counseling? 
A Yes. 
Q And have you been going to counseling? 
A I have. 
Q Have you at this point been paying for that? 
A I have not. 
Q Will that be able to continue? 
40 
1 A On several occasions he's stated no. 
2 MR. OKAZAKI: Object, hearsay. 
3 THE COURT: It is. Sustained. 
4 Q (By Ms. McConkie) Did your brothers and sisters 
5 receive similar disbursements when your parents gave you a 
6 disbursement? 
7 A Except for one brother. 
8 Q And what did he receive? 
9 A He had been cashing out of his portion because he 
10 wanted his inheritance. 
11 MR. OKAZAKI: Objection. 
12 THE COURT: Just a moment, ma'am. 
13 State the grounds of your objection. 
14 MR. OKAZAKI: It's speculation, hearsay, 
15 THE COURT: There's no foundation. I'm going to 
16 sustain the objection, but moreover, what relevance is it 
17 what her siblings got out of it? 
18 MS. McCONKIE: Your Honor, we're just trying to put 
19 evidence to show that it was a preinheritance gift and that 
20 all of the children — 
21 THE COURT: She has said that they all got money 
22 so ~ 
23 Q (By Ms. McConkie) Have you had control over any of 
24 the IRA's or any of the other marital assets during the 
25 separation? 
51 
A I have not. 
Q So is it your testimony that you have made no 
deposits? 
A None. 
Q No withdrawals? 
A None. 
Q Do you have information that would suggest that 
monies have been removed from those IRA accounts? 
A Yes. 
Q How do you have that information? 
A Bank statements. 
Q From the IRA's? 
A Yes. 
Q Where did you receive those statements? 
A From Mr. Swensen. 
Q And when did you receive those? 
A When did I? After the separation. 
Q Let me hand you a document — may I approach, your 
Honor? 
THE COURT: You may. 
Q (By Ms. McConkie) Let me hand you a document. 
Would you tell the Court what that is? 
A These are statements from USAA Money Market. 
Q Can you tell the Court on the first page — 
THE COURT: Is this an exhibit, Counsel? 
52 
MS. McCONKIE: No, this is not an exhibit, your 
Honor, it's just testimony. 
Q (By Ms. McConkie) The amount, the date on that 
document? 
A The date on the document is October 5th, 1992. 
Q And does the document have dates of certain 
withdrawals? 
A It does. 
Q Can you tell the Court the date of the first with-
drawal on that document? 
A 8-4-92. 
Q Was that a month after you had filed for divorce? 
A It was. 
Q And how much was taken out of that? 
A $1200. 
Q Would you go just quickly, read the list of amounts 
that were taken out of that IRA accounts? 
A On the same day 3,000, 1700, another 1700, 2,000, 
1200, 800, a thousand, 1500 on the one page. 
MR. OKAZAKI: Your Honor, perhaps it would assist 
the Court. These documents are found under tab 5 of our 
exhibits. 
Q (By Ms. McConkie) Would you go to the second page? 
MR. OKAZAKI: If the Court will, several pages down 
it says USAA Money Market. I don't believe it's an IRA 
53 
they're talking about. These are the last three pages under 
tab 5. That might help, your Honor. 
Q (By Ms. McConkie) The third page, what is that 
page? 
A The page is a xerox copy of checks that 
Mr. Swensen's written to himself out of this mutual fund. 
Q Do you recognize Mr. Swensen's signature? 
A I do. 
Q Can you tell the Court the amounts of those checks? 
A Twelve hundred, eight hundred, and a thousand. 
Q And if you go to the next page, what is that? 
MR. OKAZAKI: Your Honor, we'll stipulate to all 
these withdrawals that are contained — 
THE COURT: They do appear to be, at least the ones 
that she's now referred to on the — 
MR. OKAZAKI: We'll stipulate they're in our 
exhibit and we're going to testify about those withdrawals, 
so if Counsel wants to go through this, she can, but we're 
agreeing that those withdrawals were made and they're con-
tained in our exhibit. 
Q (By Ms. McConkie) Let me ask you this, 
Mrs. Swensen. Did you personally make any of those 
withdrawals? 
A I didn't. 
Q Did the Defendant ever ask you or have your 
54 
TabG 
Q So this is a list that just includes the property 
was left at the home; is that right? 
A Yes. 
Q The marital home? 
A Some of the property left at the home. 
Q Isn't it true that you took the queen-sized bed? 
A That's correct, 
Q And the double bed? 
A That was the children's. 
Q And the Eames chair? 
A That was a gift on the graduation from law school. 
Q Could you please be responsive? Just yes or no. 
A table? 
A Yes. 
Q A lamp? 
A Yes. 
Q Chairs? 
A Four folding chairs. 
Q Power tools? 
A Yes. 
Q Sports equipment? 
A Yes. 
Q And some utensils? 
A Yes. 
Q And camping equipment? 
1 A That's correct. 
2 Q And that you have taken funds out of that account 
3 which you have not paid back; isn't that true? 
4 A That's correct. 
5 Q Do you recall taking out $3500 from that account? 
6 A Thirty-five hundred? 
7 Q Thirty-five hundred. 
8 A No. 
9 Q Let me see if I can refresh your recollection on 
10 that. 
11 While I'm looking for that document, do you recall 
12 paying any marital or any accounts from your Guardian State 
13 Bank account? 
14 A Paying any accounts? 
15 Q Do you recall paying any bills from your Guardian 
16 State — 
17 A Yes. 
18 Q That are not related to the Crest View home? 
19 A Yes. 
20 Q And can you tell the Court what they are? 
21 A I've paid legal fees from that account. 
22 Q Now, those accounts were marital funds; isn't that 
23 true? 
24 A Yes. 
25 Q And you paid your legal fees from that account? 
162 
Q Okay. 
A $430, half of that's 215. 
Q Oh, okay. I see. 
A Fifth line, yes. 
Q I see it. Okay. 
Now, you actually took that $430, did you not, and 
paid that from marital funds? 
A I don't recall what the source of that amount was. 
There were some amended returns relating to the schedule on 
page 19 which I used funds from the Guardian account for. 
Q And in terms of those marital funds and in terms of 
this balance sheet, were you requesting that Mrs. Swensen 
repay you monies that you paid a marital debt from marital 
funds; is that what you are asking? 
A Yes. 
Q And did you repay those funds to the Guardian 
account? 
A No. 
Q But you're asking Mrs. Swensen repay those funds to 
the Guardian account? 
A Well, it depends on who gets the Guardian account. 
If I get the Guardian account, then it's in one pocket and 
out the other. If Mrs. Swensen gets the Guardian account, 
then it's the same thing. 
Q If in fact it was a marital debt and it was paid by 
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1 recently as August, I believe, I borrowed $3,000 to carry 
2 over my law practice. That was repaid. 
3 Q I'm going to hand you just a copy of a check that 
4 you've already testified to. On your first check, is this 
5 the check that — the $10,996.46 that you paid for your 
6 student loan? 
7 A Yes. 
8 Q And the next check down, 7,250, can you explain why 
9 you took money from the Dreyfus account and put it into the 
10 mutual fund? 
11 A Consolidated — 
12 MR. OKAZAKI: Your Honor, I'm confused. I haven't 
13 seen any of these things and I don't know if we're on the 
14 Dreyfus account or we're on the Guardian account or which 
15 account we're on. I thought you were asking about the 
16 Guardian account. 
17 Q (By Ms. McConkie) Did you write these; is that 
18 your signature? 
19 A Yes. 
20 Q And did you — and you've testified that you paid 
21 the student loan; isn't that true? 
22 A Yes. 
23 Q Did you use marital funds to do that? 
24 A Sure. 




Q — so that the fund wouldn't be deleted? 
A No. 
Q On your balance sheet which we talked about previ-
ously, which is page 1, do you recall doing a balance sheet 
in October of 1992? 
A I've done a variety of these balance sheets for 
different negotiations with Plaintiff. 
Q Do you know if the figures in the IRA's have 
increased or decreased? 
A They have — 
MR. OKAZAKI: Time frame, Counsel. 
Q (By Ms. McConkie) From the time of October 19th, 
1992, to December 1993. 
A Probably — well, I don't know. They had earnings 
and I've taken distributions. 
Q Would you be surprised to know that from the two 
balance sheets that you have provided there has been a 
decrease of $13,779? 
MR. OKAZAKI: Counsel, perhaps you could show him 
the document you're talking about. 
MS. McCONKIE: Just asking him, would you be 
surprised? 
THE WITNESS: No, I would be surprised it would be 
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